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Wag or Be Wagged:  The Chechen Wars
and the Manipulation of the Russian
Presidency
James B. Hooper
1999 was a critical year in modern Russian history.
Plagued by political and economic uncertainty after the
collapse of Soviet communism, Russians seemed to
long for a leader who could bring stability.  Vladimir
Putin’s overwhelming election to the head of the young
Russian democracy signified the dawn of a new era in
Russian politics.  Putin’s brand of authoritarian
pragmatism has produced an economically encourag-
ing Russia, with relative domestic stability and in-
creasing influence in the realm of global politics.
However, Putin’s stable Russia has been regularly
threatened by a brutal domestic conflict that continues
to claim lives and consume the resources of the
Russian military.  Since 1999, the renewal of a bloody
war of attrition with the tiny republic of Chechnya has
threatened the existence of the Chechens as a people
and the Russians as a re-emerging international
power.  More importantly, the protracted Chechen
conflict has had major implications for the role of the
president in the new Russian political order, and in
the first ten years of the position’s existence, the
manner in which the president has conducted his
Caucasus policy has been the primary driver of his
efficacy as chief executive. 
When Boris Yeltsin was elected president of the
newly founded Russian Federation in 1991, his role
was largely undefined.  As the first popularly elected
head of state in Russian history, and with an ambigu-
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ous constitution giving him the opportunity to exercise
a great deal of authority, it was up to Yeltsin to set the
precedent for his position.  Because of a loosely
defined constitutional relationship between the execu-
tive and legislative branches and a complete lack of
precedents, the president and Congress continually
butted heads for most of 1992 and 1993.  They refused
to pass Yeltsin’s dramatic economic reforms, and
rejected many of his executive appointments.  Yeltsin
attempted to clear up this constitutional relationship
by submitting a referendum on presidential powers to
the Congress in March 1993.   They not only refused1
to pass it, but the Congress attempted to impeach
Yeltsin in response.2
After the unsuccessful impeachment attempt, the
Congress and Yeltsin spent five months in effective
stalemate, and few reforms passed.  The conflict over
economic reform and the untested nature of executive-
legislative interaction were the main reasons why the
two bodies failed to work together.   During the sum-3
mer of 1993, both the Congress and President Yeltsin
drafted secret plans to dissolve the other; but the
president acted first.   On 12 September 1993, Yeltsin4
suspended the Congress and announced his plans for
an elected bicameral Federal Assembly.  In an emer-
gency session, the Congress attempted to counter
Yeltsin’s attack, but he had the legislative building
surrounded by Russian military and police forces.  A
standoff lasted until October 4, when Yeltsin ordered
1
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the military to force out the legislators.  After a short
but deadly conflict, pro-Yeltsin forces claimed control
of the nation.   5
The new constitution drafted primarily by Yeltsin’s
political aides was ratified by popular vote in Decem-
ber 1993.   The new constitution was designed with6
the express purpose of eliminating the mechanisms
that had allowed the stagnant political conditions of
the previous year.   It accomplished this, not surpris-7
ingly, by expanding the power of the executive branch.8
In addition, Yeltsin’s new constitution watered down
the potency of judicial authority by increasing the
number of judges in the Constitutional Court and
strengthened the Federation by leaving no provisions
for regional secession.  In this bold move of executive
bravado, Yeltsin succeeded overwhelmingly in
strengthening his position, if only temporarily.   9
He was able to pull off this dramatic power consolida-
tion primarily because of the favor he enjoyed with the
political and economic elites of the era.  In administer-
ing the transfer from a state-owned economic infra-
structure to a system of increased privatization, Yeltsin
had been able to create the class of elites that emerged
in post-communist Russia.  For that, he was rewarded
with significant political capital, and a fair amount of
authority in implementing his desired reforms.
According to Carnegie scholar Andrei Ryabov, Yeltsin
created a “feudal” system of oligarchic special inter-
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       The continuity of conflict began in the eighteenth century, when12
cavalrymen sent by Peter the Great were soundly defeated in an
attempt to suppress resistance to Russian rule.  Later in the same
century, a popular Sufi cleric, Sheikh Mansur, declared a holy war
against impious Muslims and Russians alike who he saw as a threat to
the sanctity of Islam.  A more protracted engagement began in 1816,
when General Alexei Yermolov was appointed as the Russian
ests.  “Lacking solid resources to retain his power, he
had to buttress it by delegating actual authority to the
largest interest groups in exchange for their loyalty.”10
Subsequently, some of the most powerful people in
Moscow were not the politicians, but those in control
of the natural gas industry, the leaders of the electric-
ity monopoly and the railways, and the young entre-
preneurs dominating the Russian financial market.11
After rewriting the constitution, Yeltsin was able to
implement more of his economic program.  However,
the collapse of the ruble in 1994 had a deleterious
effect on the realization of any economic gain that may
have come about as a result of his reforms.  Further-
more, his authority was continually compromised by
the political deterioration of Chechnya, the tiny Islamic
republic in the North Caucasus that Moscow had been
unable to control since the late 1980s.  With the rise to
power of Mikhail Gorbachev, his sweeping reforms of
the Soviet state and the subsequent dissolution of the
USSR, the Chechens saw an opportunity to throw off
the yoke of Russian imperial dominance, which had
suffocated them for centuries.   The Chechens had continu12
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Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus.  He adopted an aggressive
strategy toward the Chechens, viewed by most Russian policymakers as
‘bandits’ (a term which is still commonly used in reference to the
Chechens).  Yermolov’s ruthless tactics aimed at stopping Chechen
raids into Russian territory resulted in complete control of the regional
tribes.  But, they also sparked organized resistance among the Chechens
and inspired the rise of Chechnya’s most beloved folk hero, Imam
Shamil, who controlled the resistance beginning in 1832.  Shamil
managed to engage the Russian forces for over 30 years, leading
Chechen forces who committed their lives to the cause of the war.
During the Bolshevik Revolution, the Chechens fought on the
side of the Bolshevik Red Army, taking the opportunity to punish the
pro-tsarist Whites and hoping to gain independence at the end of the
conflict.  From 1917 to 1920, intense fighting in the North Caucasus
continued to be a significant distraction for the White Army and helped
contribute to their ultimate defeat.  Though the Chechens rose up
against the Red Army in August 1920 when they realized that they
would not be granted national independence, the rebels were defeated
and subsumed in the formation of the Soviet Union.
Under their new Soviet occupiers, the Chechens refused
absolutely to participate in the programs of Lenin and Stalin, rejecting
the affirmative action policies aimed at fostering nationalism in the
ethnic republics, as well as the collectivization procedures which began
to be implemented in the late 1920s.  In 1929, tens of thousands of
Soviet troops were sent to crush the guerrilla resistance, and the conflict
continued sporadically through the late 1930s.  By 1943 Stalin was
ready to get rid of his Chechen problem.  Accusing them, incorrectly, of
collaborating with the Nazis, Stalin ordered the deportation of the
Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars, Meskhetian Turks, and Crimean
Tatars from the North Caucasus.  478,479 Chechens and Ingush were
deported from the North Caucasus to Kazakhstan, and 78,000 died en
route or in the first harsh Kazakh winter.  The Chechens and Ingush
were thus officially removed from existence in the Soviet records, and
their lands were divided and absorbed into the boundaries of
neighboring countries.  Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Russians were
imported to inhabit the deserted cities and villages.  No mention was
made of the deportation in Soviet media for two years after the event. 
In 1956, Stalin’s successor Nikita Khrushchev officially condemned the
deportation, and re-introduced the Checheno-Ingushetian republic. 
Wag or Be Wagged 79
The displaced Chechens returned en masse, after 12 years of resilience
in the inhospitable plains of Central Asia.
The lasting effect of the deportation on the psyche of the Chechens
cannot be underemphasized.  Their return home proved their
unwavering fortitude as a people, and showed that they would never
be controlled without a fight.  In fact, more Chechens returned than had
been deported, as a result of their “ethnic solidarity and kinship-based
mutual support, sheer determination to survive and a very high birth
rate.”  The deportations not only strengthened the solidarity of the
Chechen identity and steeled their temperament against the Russian
state, but it confirmed all of their previous suspicions about the
Russians, and gave them physical, historical proof of the Russians
designs against them.  The Chechens returned to a hostile crowd of
non-Chechen squatters deeply resented the repatriation of the
deportees.  Intercultural violence became common, but mostly through
individual skirmishes and a few mob riots.  By the 1970s, most of the
imported Slavs had been pushed out of their temporary homes, the
violence had subsided, and the Chechens established their participation
in the semi-modernized state.
       Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power13
(Yale, 1998), 89-90.
ally clashed with Russians—from Peter the Great to
Stalin—who sought to bring the Caucasus under their
control.  Armed conflict was a regular occurrence over
the three centuries preceding the modern wars.  The
Chechens were actually deported for thirteen years
under Stalin as punishment for their resistance to
Soviet reforms.  When Gorbachev’s reforms began to
reach the Chechens in 1989, the concept of glasnost
brought about a turbulent atmosphere of political
activism.  By mid-1989, young Chechen activists had
formed the first political organization in the republic,
and activists throughout the Caucasus republics
began meetings in discussion of the possibility of a
“federal statehood of the peoples of the Caucasus.”13
When the Russian Federation was created, the
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Chechens organized behind the leadership of retired
Soviet air force major general Dzhokhar Dudayev and
declared themselves an independent nation.  Con-
sumed by his own battle to control the collapsing
Soviet Union and preserve the new Federation, Yeltsin
failed to successfully intervene, and the Chechen
separatists were awarded de facto independence until
he could muster up enough military and political
might to renew the conflict.  
Over the period from the Russian withdrawal to the
invasion in December of 1994, the dysfunctional
Chechen economy was not improving, unemployment
hovered around forty percent, and the expansion of the
criminal entrepreneurial sector provided at least
adequate grounds to justify Russian intervention.14
Furthermore, Yeltsin refused to meet with Dudayev to
discuss a resolution.  Viewing the Chechen leader as
head of a “criminal regime” and relying too heavily on
a close-knit cadre of manipulative hawks, Yeltsin
neglected the importance of diplomacy in resolving the
conflict.  Dudayev was guilty of the same level of
neglect, due primarily to his political inexperience and
the lack of organization within his cabinet and parlia-
ment.   15
Spurred by the conclusion of a similar standoff in
Wag or Be Wagged 81
       Tatarstan had, since the fall of the USSR, been attempting16
to negotiate its independence from Moscow.  Though its aim was
the same, Tatarstan’s “conflict” differs fundamentally from the
Chechens’ because it was resolved with diplomacy.  Moscow
managed to negotiate peace with Tatarstan and it remained part
of the Russian Federation.  After settling this dispute, Chechnya
remained a last major piece of business carried over from the
transition from USSR to RF.
       Lapidus, in “Opportunities,” 47.17
       Ibid. 48.18
       Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in19
the Caucasus (NYU, 1998), 163.
       Ibid. 20
the Central Asian region of Tatarstan,  in the interest16
of protecting valuable oil reserves and pipelines in the
Caspian region and at the behest of aggressive hawks
in his cabinet, Yeltsin authorized covert operations in
support of anti-Dudayev forces within Chechnya in
November 1994.  The operations proved to be a total
failure on a number of levels.  Dudayev’s national
army routed the opposition, taking over half of the
tanks by seizure or destruction and capturing a
handful of Russian officers as prisoners of war.  While
the Russian Defense Minister in Moscow denied any
involvement in the attempted coup, the Chechen
government blatantly displayed images of the POWs
live on television.   Still believing that a “bloodless17
blitzkrieg” could shock and awe the tiny republic into
submission within days,  Yeltsin organized a secret18
security council on November 29 to coordinate a full-
scale bombardment of Grozny and the deployment of
40,000 troops to the Chechen border.   Public com-19
ments made by Moscow policymakers estimated the
length of a successful invasion to be anywhere from
two hours to two weeks.   The invasion and bombard-20
ment were undertaken on 11 December 1994, in order
7
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       The war’s particularly brutal nature was experienced both24
in Chechnya and in Russia proper.  In June 1995 Chechen
commander Shamil Basayev’s forces entered a hospital in the
Russian town of Budennovsk, and took over a thousand patients
and hospital workers hostage.  Basayev’s raid was intended to
spark peace with Moscow.  Yeltsin was out of the country at a
conference in Canada, and deferred responsibility for handling
the crisis to his Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.  After a
to defend and restore “Russia’s unity.”   Yeltsin hoped21
to use a brief conflict and resounding victory to boost
his approval rating, which had been slipping in previ-
ous months.  However, the bombardment quickly
became a gruesome quagmire.   For the first time, the22
Russian media played a critical role in debunking the
spin of the Moscow political machine, who continued
to report decisive tactical victories and low casualties
in the wake of just the opposite.23
As the war dragged on through 1995, it became one
of the most ruthless, brutal and inhumane conflicts in
recent memory.  The Chechen forces, only 2,000 at the
onset of the war and mainly consisting of untrained
civilians, were able to engage a Russian deployment
that reached at least 20 times its size.  The Russian
forces, experiencing low morale, poor leadership and
inadequate armaments, continued to be ineffective in
suppressing the mainly guerrilla forces that made up
the Chechen resistance.   The war’s completely24
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failed attempt to storm the hospital resulted in over a hundred
deaths, Chernomyrdin agreed to grant the rebels safe passage to
Chechnya in exchange for the hostages.  This disaster
intensified widespread criticism of Yeltsin’s handling of the
entire war, and has been cited as a turning point in the first war
(Evangelista 40).
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devastating nature can be summarized by the fact that
the Russian leaders began to view the ethnic Chechen
population—not just the rebel forces—as the enemy.
They used “filtration camps,” where any suspected
rebels were rounded up, interrogated, tortured and
often never returned.  All told, the war produced over
100,000 casualties and forced over 400,000 native
Chechens to flee into refugee camps in neighboring
Dagestan and Georgia.25
Afraid of being held accountable for the disaster
that continued to take lives within Russia’s borders,
Yeltsin began to discuss the prospects for negotiated
peace in hopes of winning re-election in the spring of
1996.   Yeltsin recognized the importance of appeas-26
ing his electoral constituency, and adjusted his poli-
cies accordingly.  Although he did occasionally restrict
media access and censor the press’s freedom, for the
most part, the critical media’s voice was heard.  Where
previously, rulers like Stalin used state-controlled
media to “erase” any threats to his authority overnight,
the emergence of a critical and mostly free press meant
that Yeltsin would be held accountable for his actions.
On April 22, the Russian Army successfully assas-
sinated Dhzokhar Dudayev with a missile directed to
the signal coming from his satellite telephone.  The
removal of Dudayev from power gave Yeltsin a more
9
Hooper: Wag or Be Wagged
Published by Scholar Commons, 2006
82 Historical Perspectives March 2006
       Lieven, Tombstone, 84.21
        Many in the Russian army were outraged at the22
invasion’s poor planning, and the poor justification for it. The
official justification—“defending Russia’s unity”—did not allay
the claims of critics who cited the geopolitics of oil and political
maneuvering as the “real” motivations for war.  In fact,
according to Anatol Lieven, 557 Russian military men, from all
levels, were disciplined, dismissed, or deserted in protest of the
invasion (Evangelista 38).
       Lapidus, in “Opportunities,” 48-9.23
       The war’s particularly brutal nature was experienced both24
in Chechnya and in Russia proper.  In June 1995 Chechen
commander Shamil Basayev’s forces entered a hospital in the
Russian town of Budennovsk, and took over a thousand patients
and hospital workers hostage.  Basayev’s raid was intended to
spark peace with Moscow.  Yeltsin was out of the country at a
conference in Canada, and deferred responsibility for handling
the crisis to his Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.  After a
to defend and restore “Russia’s unity.”   Yeltsin hoped21
to use a brief conflict and resounding victory to boost
his approval rating, which had been slipping in previ-
ous months.  However, the bombardment quickly
became a gruesome quagmire.   For the first time, the22
Russian media played a critical role in debunking the
spin of the Moscow political machine, who continued
to report decisive tactical victories and low casualties
in the wake of just the opposite.23
As the war dragged on through 1995, it became one
of the most ruthless, brutal and inhumane conflicts in
recent memory.  The Chechen forces, only 2,000 at the
onset of the war and mainly consisting of untrained
civilians, were able to engage a Russian deployment
that reached at least 20 times its size.  The Russian
forces, experiencing low morale, poor leadership and
inadequate armaments, continued to be ineffective in
suppressing the mainly guerrilla forces that made up
the Chechen resistance.   The war’s completely24
Wag or Be Wagged 83
failed attempt to storm the hospital resulted in over a hundred
deaths, Chernomyrdin agreed to grant the rebels safe passage to
Chechnya in exchange for the hostages.  This disaster
intensified widespread criticism of Yeltsin’s handling of the
entire war, and has been cited as a turning point in the first war
(Evangelista 40).
       Lapidus, in “Opportunities,” n.39, 49.25
       Ibid. 49.26
devastating nature can be summarized by the fact that
the Russian leaders began to view the ethnic Chechen
population—not just the rebel forces—as the enemy.
They used “filtration camps,” where any suspected
rebels were rounded up, interrogated, tortured and
often never returned.  All told, the war produced over
100,000 casualties and forced over 400,000 native
Chechens to flee into refugee camps in neighboring
Dagestan and Georgia.25
Afraid of being held accountable for the disaster
that continued to take lives within Russia’s borders,
Yeltsin began to discuss the prospects for negotiated
peace in hopes of winning re-election in the spring of
1996.   Yeltsin recognized the importance of appeas-26
ing his electoral constituency, and adjusted his poli-
cies accordingly.  Although he did occasionally restrict
media access and censor the press’s freedom, for the
most part, the critical media’s voice was heard.  Where
previously, rulers like Stalin used state-controlled
media to “erase” any threats to his authority overnight,
the emergence of a critical and mostly free press meant
that Yeltsin would be held accountable for his actions.
On April 22, the Russian Army successfully assas-
sinated Dhzokhar Dudayev with a missile directed to
the signal coming from his satellite telephone.  The
removal of Dudayev from power gave Yeltsin a more
10
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 11 [2006], Art. 10
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol11/iss1/10
84 Historical Perspectives March 2006
       Evangelista 43.27
       Ibid. 44.28
       Anatol Lieven, “Nightmare in the Caucasus,” Washington29
Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2000): 46.
consistent leader to deal with, as Aslan Maskhadov
was appointed commander of the armed forces.
However, Yeltsin’s commitment to peace in Chechnya
seemed only to be a meaningless campaign promise;
after successfully reclaiming his presidential post, he
failed to withdraw the troops he vowed to relieve.  After
his reelection, the Russian forces resumed their
ground offensives, inflicting civilian casualties in the
mountain villages thought to be headquarters for key
Chechen leaders.   Just as the conflict seemed to27
spiral out of control, a surprise attack on the eve of
Yeltsin’s inauguration changed the tide of the war.
Maskhadov and a force of just 1,500 Chechens
stormed the capital, held by no less than 12,000
Russians, and decisively defeated the unsuspecting
occupiers.  After subsequent bombardment, Yeltsin
saw the reality of the exhausted conflict; and he
authorized newly appointed secretary of the Security
Council, Alexander Lebed, to negotiate peace with
Maskhadov.   28
The resulting Khasavyurt Peace Agreement negoti-
ated by the two diplomats was signed on 31 August
1996.  The accord required that Russia withdraw all its
troops from Chechnya, and that it officially recognize
Chechnya’s internal government.   Subsequently,29
Maskhadov was elected president of a semi-autono-
mous Chechnya.  The second set of negotiations,
carried out by Maskhadov’s government in May of
1997, “On Peace and the Principles of Relations
between the Russian Federation and the Chechen
Wag or Be Wagged 85
       Ryabov, “Elections,” 3.30
Republic of Ichkeria,” deferred responsibility to draft
an explicit solution until 2001.  For the time, the
Chechens were again given de facto independence.
Yeltsin’s popularity declined severely almost
immediately following his reelection primarily due to
widespread rumors of corruption in his cabinet and
among his political supporters.  The tools he had used
to strengthen his political base through his commit-
ment to special interests came back to haunt him.  As
Ryabov explains, “though fairly stable, such a system
has been inefficient in terms of addressing wider
national tasks and meeting new challenges.”   Al-30
though the system of exchanging rewards for political
support gave Yeltsin his power in the early years of his
government, it ultimately caused his demise.  Faced
with deep-seated economic crises and deteriorating
health, he continued to defer responsibility to his
ministers, and was at the beck and call of his elite
supporters.  Characterized by conflicts with the
Federal Assembly over prime minister appointments,
constant cabinet reshuffling, numerous heart attacks
and other serious health issues, Yeltsin’s second term
was a disaster  
In Chechnya, after the departure of Russian forces
in 1996, little had changed.  As a leader, Maskhadov
was unable to convert the energy of revolution and
nationalism into organized state institutions.  Al-
though citizens in Grozny could live without fear of
aerial bombardment, most of the governmental infra-
structure remained debilitated, gainful employment
opportunities were scarce and the most promising
opportunities were in crime and banditry.  Throughout
the peace period, Yeltsin’s government was unable to
11
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develop a strategy for dealing with the Chechens,
especially since it was consumed by many of its own
problems, including the August 1998 financial crisis.
However, chaos within the Chechen borders as a result
of Maskhadov’s inability to exercise any influence over
the organized bandits led to a growing recognition that
another conflict was imminent.  Numerous border
disputes between Islamists and Russians heightened
that tension, and by the summer of 1999 the situation
re-ignited.31
On August 7, 1999, a force of anywhere from 300
to 2,000 radical Islamists marched across the
Dagestani border.  The soldiers were part of a minority
resistance group comprised of Dagestanis and
Chechens, along with some Arabs and other foreign
Muslims, and their aim was to set up an Islamic state
independent from the Russian Federation and
Maskhadvov’s Chechnya.  However, they overestimated
the popularity of their strict Wahhabi sect in Dagestan,
and met local resistance almost immediately.  Seeing
Wahhabi law as a threat to their own balance of Islam
and government, local Dagestani officials appealed to
the Russians for military assistance, who responded
with relative quickness.  Only days after the “Quranic32
puritans” entered Dagestan, newly appointed Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin announced that he had been
appointed to restore the rule of law to the border
republics and that he would resolve the continuing
conflict in Dagestan within two weeks.   After two33
weeks of fighting, the rebels had retreated into
Wag or Be Wagged 87
       Ibid. 34
       Lieven, “Nightmare,” 150.35
       Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and36
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Chechen villages, which were subsequently shelled by
the Russian military.  34
Even though the insurgents, led by an enigmatic
rebel named Shamil Basayev, represent the views of a
minority of Chechens, they have become the predomi-
nant face of the Chechen separatist movement, and
have had the most potent influence on Moscow’s
policy.  Their mobilizing, anti-Russian ideology, though
it has appealed to many of the marginalized youth who
see it as “the only discipline that can hold their society
together,” has not taken hold among the majority of
Chechens.   However, the brutality of the Russians in35
their pursuit of complete destruction of the Chechen
rebels has given Basayev’s camp legitimacy in the eyes
of the Chechens.  The Russians have carried out their
operations against the Chechens as a people and not
just against the opposition forces, and have used
filtration camps, aerial bombardment and torture
indiscriminately in both wars.   The Chechens come36
from a tradition of family honor and clan loyalty, where
blood feuds and grudges between two groups can last
generations.   To the Chechens, the Stalinist deporta-37
tions and the inhumanity of the wars of the last ten
years have sufficiently justified a radical response in
the name of national pride.  In other words, the
Russians themselves have radicalized the Chechen
population.
In September 1999 after the rebels had been
pushed out of Dagestan, four explosions in Moscow
and Dagestan apartment buildings claimed over 300
13
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lives.  Before any evidence had even been collected,
Chechens had already been convicted for these crimes
in the court of public opinion and in the war rooms of
the Kremlin.   No terrorists were ever found, and no38
group claimed responsibility.   The nature of the39
bombings was further called into question when local
police in the city of Ryazan discovered a bomb that had
been planted by Russian FSB (formerly KGB) security
officials.  Two days after the incident, the FSB director
announced that the agents had planted the bomb as a
drill to test the readiness of local police forces, and
that the dismantled apparatus contained sugar, not
real explosives.  Just why the FSB would be engaged
in such activities has never been sufficiently explained
by security officials or the Kremlin.40
Following this bizarre series of events and the
Kremlin’s insistence on Chechen terrorists’ involve-
ment, the Russian public became significantly inse-
cure.  Shortly after the explosions, Putin appeared in
front of the Duma and the Russian people, stating that
his goal was “to defend the population from the ban-
dits.”   Declaring his intention to wipe out the bandits41
“in the shitter,” Putin’s aggressiveness became a
source of stability for the Russian people, and his
popularity skyrocketed.   Though Putin publicly42
stated his commitment to negotiate with Maskhadov,
he almost immediately called for a full-scale invasion.
Wag or Be Wagged 89
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By October, Russian troops had entered Chechnya,
and the war had reignited with renewed ruthlessness.
Maskhadov had no choice but to defend his nation.
Faced with destruction, the secular separatists joined
forces with the Islamists, and attempted to fend off the
Russian offensives.  In much the same fashion as the
first war, the Russian ground forces met stiff resis-
tance as they advanced on Grozny.  Just before
Christmas, the Russians began an organized attack to
retake the Chechen capital, and it fell two months
later.   On New Year’s Eve, 1999, Boris Yeltsin made43
a surprise announcement: he was resigning, effective
immediately.  Putin was named acting president until
the upcoming election.  In lieu of his early resignation,
the election was moved up to March.  Putin’s popular-
ity would not have time to erode if victory in Chechnya
proved elusive, and his competitors would not have
enough time to organize effective campaigns against
him.  Though Putin’s approval rating had been thirty-
five percent when Yeltsin appointed him to Prime
Minister in August, it had surpassed sixty-five percent
by October, and would not drop below sixty percent for
the next four years, as he was overwhelmingly elected
president in March 2000.44,45
The Russian army was successful in pushing the
rebels out of Chechnya’s major urban areas within the
first two months of 2000.  They used heavy-handed
tactics to trap the rebels and destroy the Chechen
towns.  Though they inflicted heavy casualties, they
did not squash the resistance as Putin had promised.
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The increasingly effective rebel forces abandoned the
cities, moved into the hills, and focused their energy
on insurgency and guerrilla tactics.  Through 2004,
the state of affairs in Chechnya had changed little.
The Russian military, badly in need of dramatic reform
and terribly under-funded, performed dismally.
Despite their large numbers, dependence on often
untrained conscripts, devastatingly low morale and a
lack of adequate materials have made the Russian
operation a catastrophe.  In addition, the rebels
became increasingly adept at frustrating the Russians’
efforts to secure the region, gaining more and more
experience and recruiting more support with the war’s
continued brutality.   Regular acts of terrorism have46
been carried out by Basayev’s groups throughout
Russia proper, taking the lives of many innocent
victims.  Though the death toll continues to rise, Putin
announced the end of the military conflict in 2001,
turning what he now called an “anti-terrorist opera-
tion” over to the FSB.   Troops have had to remain in47
Chechnya because of continued raids by the rebels,
and no sign of a break on either side—or the imposi-
tion of order—seems likely.  48
After his election to the presidency, Putin wasted
no time carrying out some dramatic reforms.  Capital-
izing on the support garnered from his firm handling
of the Chechen crisis, Putin consolidated federal power
Wag or Be Wagged 91
and authority in the Kremlin and deliberately elevated
the role of the Russian executive branch.  His primary
reforms have weakened regional governors and local
leaders in favor of more control in the center, disci-
plined the “oligarchs” to reassert his executive author-
ity and muzzled the media insofar as it has been
critical of his policies.  These accomplishments have
effectively made the Russian political system more
vertical and have had a strong stabilizing effect on the
nation as a whole, but have reversed many of the
pluralistic reforms of the 1990s.  Their success has
been completely dependent on Putin’s manipulation of
the conflict in Chechnya.
Although initially regarded as a puppet to the
interests of Yeltsin’s corrupt “family” of special inter-
ests, Putin quickly demonstrated that he would not be
anyone’s pawn by carrying out major reforms within
months of his inauguration.  In May 2000, Putin
presented a decree establishing seven federal adminis-
trative regions within the Russian Federation that
would subsequently control the 89 individual regions.
These seven “super-regions”—corresponding directly
with the administrative districts within the Russian
military—would be run by Putin appointees, and five
out of seven came from the “power ministries”: the
FSB, police forces, and the military.  According to
Nikolai Petrov and Darrel Slider, the main motive
behind this move seems to have been Putin’s desire to
“take away or circumscribe most powers exercised by
regional leaders.  His goal appears to be to establish a
unitary state under the guise of ‘restoring effective
vertical power to the country,’ to use Putin’s own
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description of his intentions.”   49
Under Yeltsin, a system of federalism had emerged,
with each of the 89 regions gaining some authority
comparable to America’s states with the creation of the
Federation Council in 1993.  For the first time, regions
were given veto power over the congress, as a bicam-
eral legislative system was implemented.  The Federa-
tion Council members were primarily regional gover-
nors who were given immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion, could not be unilaterally removed by the presi-
dent and were chosen by popular election beginning in
1996.  Although intended by Yeltsin to bolster his
political power for the 1996 election, these reforms
effectively strengthened the regions’ sway over federal
policies, undermining Yeltsin’s ability to govern.50
Putin’s establishment of the “super-regions” was just
one way of reclaiming central control over the regions.
Putin has also gutted the power of the Federation
Council members by changing the way its members
were chosen.  He prohibited regional governors from
serving as council members, initiated laws that gave
the president the right to single-handedly dismiss
regional governors and governments and composed a
new tax code that shifted to Moscow greater responsi-
bility in the distribution of tax revenues.  By creating
a buffer between regional executives and federal
congresspersons, Putin was able to rein in the legisla-
ture and gain its cooperation.  Moreover, the limita-
tions Putin placed on regional governors allowed him
to remove many of his opponents from office, subduing
Wag or Be Wagged 93
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opposition candidates have been extra-judicially removed from
ballots only days before the election, and others where political
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those regional governors who had flourished under
Yeltsin’s brand of political favoritism.  Once disallowed
from participation in the Federation Council, the
regional executives lost their immunity from criminal
prosecution.  Using his FSB connections to gather
compromising evidence against these regional gover-
nors, Putin has prosecuted unruly governors or “dis-
suaded” them from seeking office again, and has also
used the power ministries to sabotage political cam-
paigns.   As a result of these strong-arm tactics, by51
the end of 2003 over one-third of all regional heads
had been replaced under Putin.52
These strategies have been absolutely crucial in
tightening Putin’s grip on the Russian government and
would have been completely unacceptable without the
destabilizing presence of the Chechen conflict lingering
within Russia’s borders.  Putin’s primary justification
for his centralizing decrees has been “to restore the
preeminence of federal law” and to affirm and “define
the division of powers between the center, regions, and
local government.”   These assertions unabashedly53
echo the earlier claims of Yeltsin when he entered
Chechnya in 1994 to restore constitutional authority
and defend Russia’s unity.  The regions were continu-
ally destabilized throughout the 1990s, with Chechnya
being the most extreme example of this instability.
Without the ability to constantly cite Chechnya as an
example of Russia’s failure to maintain or-
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der—especially in the border regions—Putin would not
have enjoyed the public’s overwhelming support
throughout these first reforms. 
Putin’s pursuit of the oligarchs and his chokehold
on the media cannot be viewed independently.  As
mentioned earlier, the class of entrepreneurs known as
oligarchs that emerged under the transition to privat-
ization wielded significant sway over Yeltsin.  Similar
to his relationship with regional governors, Yeltsin
granted favors to the oligarchs who controlled the
country’s economy in exchange for political support.
In many cases, the people who controlled the largest
economic conglomerates additionally created media
companies that gave them invaluable influence over
public opinion, their lack of financial success notwith-
standing.  By the mid-1990s, the owners and editorial
policy advisers of the burgeoning “independent” media
also owned the most powerful investment firms, ran
the largest oil companies and directed Russia’s largest
banks.   Because of their considerable influence in the54
newly formed independent media, these young entre-
preneurs could offer Yeltsin much in the way of
political capital.  These same moguls manipulated and
dictated the policies of the Kremlin and funded and
supported Yeltsin’s bid for reelection in 1996.55
In the first Chechen war, the new critical media,
despite its electoral support for Yeltsin, played a
paramount role in forcing Yeltsin to negotiate peace
with Maskhadov.  Journalists from around the world
and within Russia itself had free reign in Chechnya,
Wag or Be Wagged 95
       Lipman and McFaul, 58.56
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and their access led to vitriolic criticism of the Kremlin
and the military, often championing the cause of the
resilient rebels.  In response to a devastatingly low
public approval rating as the 1996 election ap-
proached, Yeltsin made a number of overtures toward
peace, including ceasefires and promises to bring the
troops home.  Although he temporarily renewed the
attacks after winning the presidency, the continued
criticism by the media highlighted the bankrupt
campaign of the Russian military.  Those television
stations and print media that were most critical of the
Russian campaign became ratings leaders, and devel-
oped strong commitments to professionalism, integrity,
and accuracy in their reporting.   56
The two most successful oligarchs-turned-media
magnates were Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris
Berezovsky, and they were the primary victims in
Putin’s battle for vertical control.  They owned Russia’s
most prominent independent television and radio
stations and print media.  Because of their position at
the front of the elite pack that controlled the media
and the economy as well as their public opposition to
his administration, Gusinsky and Berezovsky were
targeted  by  Putin and deliberately taken down shortly
after his election.  Putin invoked obscure legal loop-
holes, used financial leverage possessed by state-
controlled conglomerates and utilized the power
ministries to threaten and coerce compliance from
these media groups, either forcing stations to go off the
air or taking control of the leadership in these groups
and “encouraging” a softer editorial line.   Often, when57
the Kremlin would get control of a TV station or
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newsmagazine, they would simply replace the content
with sports coverage.  Within a year of his election,
Putin had succeeded.   Although regional stations still
maintained more objective criticism of Russian poli-
tics, on a national level there was not much dissent
against the president.58
Although Putin’s attacks on the free press did not
go without protest,  the Russian public seemed largely59
unconcerned.  According to nationwide surveys, only
fifteen percent of Russians believed that Gusinsky was
persecuted in order to prevent criticism, only seven
percent saw the closure of Berezovsky’s TV-6 as a
direct result of Putin’s intervention  and “only four60
percent of the public [regarded] the NTV takeover as a
state attempt to limit media freedom.”  In addition, in61
October 2003, fifty-three percent of Russians held this
statement as their personal view: “The authorities are
in no way threatening free speech, and are not squeez-
ing out independent media.”   The seeming lack of62
concern among Russians for Putin’s subjugation of the
media can only be explained by recognizing the high
degree of instability and fear in Russian society
brought on by the Chechen war.  The same dedicated
audience that brought NTV to the height of popularity
and demanded an independent and critical media
during the first war now looked on, disinterested, as
that same media was crushed.  The lack of public
Wag or Be Wagged 97
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       Anna Politkovskaya, “Russian Journalist Anna65
Politkovskaya, Poisoned,” 09 September 2004,
<http://penusa.org/go/home> 25 February 2005.  In 2002,
Putin ridiculed NTV for its coverage of the Moscow theater
hostage crisis, calling it “sensationalism” designed to boost the
station’s ratings (Lipman and McFaul, 67).
dialogue over the second war is a sad phenomenon,
and is a testimony to the Russians’ collective insecu-
rity.
In Putin’s quest for a monotone media environ-
ment, he has continually used the war in Chechnya as
justification for his actions.  In the early months of the
war, Russian security services arrested Radio Liberty
correspondent Andrei Babitsky in Chechnya and held
him for over a month.  When asked about the re-
porter’s whereabouts, Putin alleged that Babitsky
“worked directly for the enemy—for the bandits.”   He63
claimed that Babitsky was supplying the Chechens
with maps of Russian military checkpoints and giving
them advice on how to get around them.   Putin’s64
administration has disallowed unaccredited journalists
from entering Chechnya and has only handed out
accreditations to Kremlin loyalists.  Those who have
reported critically from Chechnya have been intimi-
dated, poisoned, arrested or at the very least have had
their accreditations revoked.  Although Putin has
rarely made public statements indicating that he has
knowledge or complicity in these actions, he has
justified the silencing of critical journalists by deeming
their reports sensational and unpatriotic.65
By attacking the oligarchs through their media
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holdings, Putin has achieved a dual victory, and he
has been able to do so as a result of the national
sentiment that he stirred-up by invading Chechnya.
Playing on the popularity of a renewed conflict with the
Chechen separatists and using the widespread fears
among the Russian people to bolster his political base,
Putin rode to reform on his image as an aggressive
pragmatist.  Although he did suffer a ten percent
popularity drop when his attacks on Gusinsky, the
media and the regions were made public, his support
base was so large that he even then maintained the
favor of over sixty percent of the Russian electorate.66
When the Soviet Union disbanded, Russia’s reform-
ers had the power to set the precedents that would
determine Russia’s role in the redefined global political
environment.  Boris Yeltsin faced the challenge of
balancing the untested principles of democracy and
managing the economy and infrastructure of what was
still the world’s largest nation.  While in 1993 he
sought to strengthen the potency of the executive
branch to gain more freedom to implement economic
reform, he insisted on having his new constitution
approved by a referendum of the Russian people.
Rather than forcing it by decree, Yeltsin was commit-
ted to passing the constitution using democratic
methods to give it added legitimacy.   Although he67
would not always abide by or fully conform to the rules
of democracy, Yeltsin showed a commitment to main-
taining at least the basic forms of a democratic nation.
While consumed by his efforts to stabilize Russia
proper, Yeltsin allowed the renegade Chechen republic
to become continually less stable.  His refusal to
Wag or Be Wagged 99
       McFaul, Unfinished Revolution, 258.68
negotiate with Dudayev’s government, the influence of
his cadre of hawks and his desire to use a quick
decisive victory to bolster his public approval rating all
led to the mistaken military deployment to Chechnya.
Yeltsin hoped that he could benefit from engaging the
Chechen military and restoring the “constitutional
integrity” of the Russian Federation, but the exact
opposite happened.  After more than a year of devas-
tating military defeats and unrelenting criticism from
the press, the prospects for Yeltsin’s wag-the-dog
victory in the Caucasus were about nil.  Recognizing
the importance of the upcoming elections, the rising
political stock of his communist opposition and his
dreadfully low approval rating, Yeltsin began to make
efforts to find peace with the Chechens.  
On one hand, Yeltsin finally did manipulate the war
to successfully augment his popularity with the public.
He clearly had no intention of honoring the cease-fires
negotiated under the banner of his reelection cam-
paign, as he renewed fighting soon after his election.
So, a year and a half late, Yeltsin got his public rela-
tions military victory.  On the other hand, however,
Yeltsin’s administration truly had become a victim of
his failed Chechen War.  Within a month of the original
invasion, only sixteen percent of Russians supported
the use of force in Chechnya.   What started as a68
dramatic and grandiose attempt to reassert his execu-
tive authority became a domestic tragedy the likes of
which had not been seen for decades and one which
remains a blight on the body politic of the Russian
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political stock of his communist opposition and his
dreadfully low approval rating, Yeltsin began to make
efforts to find peace with the Chechens.  
On one hand, Yeltsin finally did manipulate the war
to successfully augment his popularity with the public.
He clearly had no intention of honoring the cease-fires
negotiated under the banner of his reelection cam-
paign, as he renewed fighting soon after his election.
So, a year and a half late, Yeltsin got his public rela-
tions military victory.  On the other hand, however,
Yeltsin’s administration truly had become a victim of
his failed Chechen War.  Within a month of the original
invasion, only sixteen percent of Russians supported
the use of force in Chechnya.   What started as a68
dramatic and grandiose attempt to reassert his execu-
tive authority became a domestic tragedy the likes of
which had not been seen for decades and one which
remains a blight on the body politic of the Russian
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       From the very beginning, Yeltsin was constantly69
scrambling to get out from under the conflict’s tremendous
shadow.  When the covert operations designed to take down
Dudayev failed and Russian military hostages were paraded on
the news, his military was left with its foot in its mouth.  When
his promise of a quick military campaign proved impossible, his
approval rating slid even lower.  Yeltsin often lied quite blatantly
in public statements about the war, further eroding the Russian
people’s trust in him (Evangelista, 39).  When his prime minister
had to negotiate the Budennovsk hostage crisis, Russians grew
even more doubtful that Yeltsin could manage the country or the
war.  Following that incident, Yeltsin’s opposition in the Duma
passed a vote of no confidence in the government.  Only by a
dramatic second vote was the decision overturned and Yeltsin’s
administration able to retain control.  Until the Khasavyurt
Peace was signed, the Chechen conflict was perhaps the biggest
threat to the security and stability of Yeltsin’s government
(McFaul, Unfinished Revolution, 260-1).  
Ultimately, Yeltsin’s involvement in Chechnya became a
thorn in his side, a burden from which he was always trying to
escape.  Interestingly, Yeltsin’s aforementioned commitment to
democratic forms can be credited with ending the First Chechen
War.  Throughout the entire ordeal, media presence in the region
increased significantly and became increasingly critical of
Yeltsin’s government.  Indeed, it was this conflict that gave rise
to the independent media that has since been suppressed under
Putin.  Though the growing media presence had a strong impact
on Yeltsin’s low approval rating, he resorted to acts of extra-
judicial sabotage.  He knew the importance of supporting
legitimate democratic structures, and—though he occasionally
crossed the line to hush the opposition—he gave the press
freedom of expression sufficient enough to make an impact on
the operations of the government (Shevtsova, “Power and
Leadership in Putin’s Russia,” Russia After the Fall, Andrew C.
Kuchins, ed. (Carnegie, 2002), 68).
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Putin’s experience in Chechnya would differ greatly
from Yeltsin’s.  Whereas Yeltsin sought unsuccessfully
to use an invasion to gain political support, Putin
successfully used Russians’ sense of insecurity to
Wag or Be Wagged 101
create a national diversion, jumpstart his political
career and undermine regional autonomy and the
strength of the independent press.  Recognizing the
traits of the Yeltsin-state that contributed to its
weaknesses and ineffectual policies, Putin attempted
to build on the Chechen engagement to centralize his
regime and forestall any challenge to his authority.
While Yeltsin’s system of “oligarchic feudalism” had
made him a pawn to those political players who had
helped keep him in power, Putin engaged in a cam-
paign of selective persecution that showed those
power-brokers that he would not be manipulated
against his will.  Yeltsin was a slave to the interests of
the oligarchs and the regional barons; Putin used his
ties to the security services to make sure that political
elites would be subservient to him.  Yeltsin’s respect
for a democracy in form (if not in substance) meant
that he occasionally pandered to the demands of a
highly critical independent media, especially around
elections.  By restricting the national media, Putin has
again used the environment of war for his benefit by
eliminating that critical voice, and his approval rating
has hardly wavered since.
For centuries, the mentality of war has been used
as a fog of opportunity for despots and demagogues
hoping to further repressive agendas or fill the national
coffers.  Though desperate times call for desperate
measures, wars have often been used as an excuse to
achieve unrelated political ends.  Disturbingly common
wag the dog tactics used to distract the public from
politicians’ ulterior motives have historically been
effective and have escaped condemnation.  Citizens
have been willing to allow atrocities and injustice in
exchange for national security and economic stability.
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Putin’s formula for political stability—a prime example
of this scenario—has been successful, and his regime
has been the strongest Russia has seen in years.  It
will be interesting to see, however, how long a regime
founded on manipulation and opportunism can
survive, and at what cost to those who agreed to look
the other way for the sake of stability.
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Elusive Matriarchy:  The Impact of the
Native American and Feminist Move-
ments on Navajo Gender Dynamics
Holly Kearl
Contact with European invaders impacted all
Native Americans.  From the introduction of new items
through trade, to fatal diseases, intermarriage, com-
munity relocation and forced “civilizing,” Native Ameri-
can lives would never be the same.  The Navajo, or
Diné, a name they also call themselves, were able to
avoid many of these problems longer than other tribes,
helping make them one of the largest tribes in the
United States today.  Although their population has
fared relatively well, forced assimilation by the United
States government, specifically during the 1920s and
1930s, affected many aspects of Navajo life, including
gender dynamics.  The outcome of the changes from
assimilation made women more economically and
politically dependent on men than they had been
previously.  Before assimilation, women and men were
able to equally contribute to the family income and, as
a matriarchal society, women played a significant
social and political role, but the assimilation program
in the United States reduced women’s economic and
political status.  During the 1960s and 1970s there
was a nation-wide movement of Native American
people for self-determination, cultural pride and a
renewal of traditional ways, which may have meant a
re-emphasis of matriarchy among the Navajo.  How-
ever, it turned out that the Native American Movement
had little impact among the Navajo.  Instead, it was the
contemporary Feminist Movement that had a greater,
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